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RECENT DECISIONS
Torts - Liability of Charitable Institutions - Plaintiff brought an
action of tort against defendant, a private corporation organized solely
for charitable and religious purposes, to recover for injuries sustained
in a fall on ice which had formed on a public sidewalk allegedly as a
result of the negligent construction and maintenance of the church
premises. Defendant's answer claimed immunity from all liability, and
the trial court overruled plaintiff's demurrer to the answer. Held: de-
cree overruling demurrer reversed. The fact that the defendant is a
privately conducted religious and charitable institution does not entitle
it to any exemption or immunity from liability for injury caused by
negligence. Such a charity is not entitled to immunity either under the
trust fund theory, beneficiary theory, or under the doctrine of respon-
deat superior. Foster v. Roman Catholic Diocese of Vermont, 70 A.
(2d) 230, (N.H., 1950).
Since an early English case in 18461 which held a charitable organ-
ization cannot be held liable for the payment of tort claims there have
been numerous theories advanced as basis for this immunity. Some
place is upon the ground of public policy; others upon the ground that
since the funds of the institution are impressed with a trust for chari-
table purposes they cannot be diverted to other uses; others on a repu-
diation of the doctrine of respondeat superior; and still others upon the
ground of an implied waiver on the part of voluntary recipients of the
charity of any claim for damages.
Relative to the theory that public policy will deny recovery to an
injured plaintiff the courts imply that since charitable organizations are
supported by the benevolent and their energies are devoted to the sick
and needy a tort claim would not only discourage these institutions
but would destroy them.? In 1910, the court of Maine3 maintained a
charitable hospital is not liable for the negligence of its nurses in per-
mitting a patient to fall from a window. This was on the theory that
if a charitable organization would often be in litigation they would
"ultimately cease or become greatly impaired in their usefulness." On
the same ground recovery was denied to a patient who was burnt by a
nurse while administering an anesthetic ;4 or died because of the negli-
gence of a nurse ;5 or was injured by a gallery falling in a public hall.6
I Feoffees of Heriot's Hospital v. Ross, 12C.&F. 507, 8 Eng. Rep. 1508 (1846).
2 10 Am. Jur. sec. 147; Prosser on Torts, sec. 108, p. 1082.
3 Jensen v. Maine Eye & Ear Infirmary, 107 Me. 408, 78 A. 898 (1910).
4 Lindler v. Columbia Hospital, 98 S.C. 25, 81 S.E. 512 (1914).
5 Weston's Adm'x. v. Hospital of St. Vincent of Paul, 131 Va. 587, 107 S.E. 785,
23 A.L.R. 907 (1921).
a Vermillion v. Woman's College of Due West, 104 S.C. 197, 88 S.E. 649, 14
A.L.R. 590 (1916).
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Cases answer this argument by maintaining while the public has an
interest in the maintenance of a public charity, it also has an interest
that the service be performed carefully.
7
Another theory of no liability is based upon a repudiation of the
doctrine of respondeat superior. This is followed by the Wisconsin
court" which holds that charitable hospitals are not liable to their pa-
tients for negligence of employees selected with due care whether these
patients are paying or free. Theories advanced to defeat this vicarious
liability are that the charity derives no gain or benefit from the services
rendered ;9 or that the charity cannot direct the treatment of patients by
skilled physicians as masters may ordinarily direct their servants;1o
or that now the rule is so firmly established that it is beyond question
that the beneficiary can recover from the benefactor. 1 However the
doctrine of respondeat superior has been followed by some jurisdictions
oti the ,theory that a patient who is willing to pay and does pay can
recover inasmuch as there was a contract for taking proper care of
the patient.'2
Another theory advanced denying liability is the trust fund doc-
trine. The rationale of this doctrine as applied to charitable institutions
maintains that trust funds created for charitable purposes should not
be diverted therefrom to pay damages arising from torts of servants,
for such purposes were never intended by the donors. 13 Some courts
have attacked the logic of this theory, pointing out that other trust
funds are not exempt from liability incurred in administering the
trust, 4 and that the doctrine has been so weakened that it does not have
much practical application or importance.' 5
Some jurisdictions have relied on the theory that the recipient of
the benefits of charity accepts them as they are given, assumes the risk
of negligence, and by implication agrees to "waive" the liability and
7Glavin v. Rhode Island Hospital, 12 R.I. 411, 34 Am, Rep. 675 (1879) ; Geiger
v. Simpsom Methodist-Episcopal Church of Minneapolis, 174 Minn. 389, 219
N.W. 463, 62 A.L.R. 716 (1928) ; Sheehan v. North Country Community Hos-
pital, 273 N.Y. 163, 7 N.E. (2d) 28 (1937).
8 Morrison v. Henke, 165 Wis. 166, 230 N.W. 708 (1917); Schau v. Morgan, 241
Wis. 334, 6 N.W. (2d) 212 (1942).
9 Farrigan v. Pevear, 193 Mass. 147, 78 N.E. 855 (1906); Hearns v. Waterbury
Hospital, 66 Conn. 88, 33 A. 595 (1895) ; Bachman v. Y.M.C.A., 179 Wis. 178,
191 N.W. 751 (1923).
10 Union P. R. Co. v. Artist, 9 C.C.A. 14, 19 U.S. App. 612, 60 Fed. 365 (1894).
1 Cunningham v. Sheltering Arms, 135 App. Div. 178, 119 N.Y. Supp. 1033 (1909).
12 Tucker v. Mobile Infirmary Asso., 191 Ala. 572, 68 So. 4 (1915) ; Morton v.
Savannah Hospital, 148 Mass. 438, 96 S.E. 887 (1918).
13 Roosen v. Peter Benf Bringham Hospital, 235 Mass. 66, 126 N.E. 392, 14 A.L.R.
563 (1920); Adams v. University Hospital, 122 Mo. App. 675, 99 S.W. 453
(1907).
14 Prosser on Torts, sec. 108, p. 1081.
15 Geiger v. Simpson Methodist-Episcopal Church of Minneapolis, 174 Minn. 389,
219 N.W. 463, 62 A.L.R. 716 (1928).
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assert no tort claim against his benefactor.as However, Neil, Ch. J., in
Gamble v. Vanderbilt University"' says:
"There are cases from time to time occurring, and not alto-
gether infrequent, to which it is, as it seems to us, impossible
to apply it-patients conveyed to hospitals in demented condi-
tion, persons temporarily unconscious from injuries and who re-
quire immediate surgical and other attention, those who are so
debilitated by disease to have no power of understanding the
terms of a contract, children too young to understand the mean-
ing of a contract, or to make or be bound by one in any form, or
even to understand the nature of the work to be done for them.
How can such persons be held to waive a right of action which
the law gives them? How can they be held to have agreed to an
exemption ?"
Some courts refuse to recognize any of these doctrines and hold a
charitable institution liable if negligent.'s Courts generally impose lia-
bility where a stranger is injured by defendant's agents, 9 or to a ser-
vant,20 or to a business visitor,21 or if a safe place statute is applicable. 22
JoHN D. STEIN
Torts - Communist not Slander per se - Plaintiff, business man-
ager for a labor union, brought action for slander. The complaint
alleged the defendants said, "He, Plaintiff, is a dirty low down Com-
munist, that Mr. Krumholz, Plaintiff, and the union are a bunch of
Communists, and that Mr. Krumholz is a dirty Communist." Defen-
dants moved for dismissal on the grounds that the complaint was legally
insufficient, and did not state a cause of action. Held: The New York
Supreme Court, Special Term, ruled that calling a person a Communist
was not slander per se and could not be maintained in the absence of
allegations that plaintiff suffered damage through injury to his busi-
ness or property. The complaint was dismissed with leave to amend.
It was necessary to plead that the statements made referred to or con-
cerned the plaintiff in his business for the words to be actionable per
16 Mikota v. Sisters of Mercy, 183 Iowa 1378, 168 N.W. 219 (1918); Burdell v.
St. Luke's Hospital, 37 Cal. App. 310, 173 P. 1008 (1918).
"7 138 Tenn. 616, 200 S.W. 510 (1917).
Is Basabo v. Salvation Army, 35 R.I. 22, 85 A. 120, 14 A.L.R. 576 (1912).
'9 Marble v. Nicholas Senn Hospital Asso., 102 Neb. 343, 167 N.W. 208 (1918);
Simmon v. Wiley M. E. Church, 112 N.J.L. 129, 170 A. 237 (1934).20 Hordern v. Salvation Army, 199 N.Y. 233, 92 N.E. 626 (1910).
21 Cohen v. General Hospital Soc. of Connecticut, 113 Conn. 188, 154 A. 435
(1931).
22 Wilson v. Evangelical Luthern Church, 202 Wis. 111, 230 N.W. 708 (1930);
Wis. Stat. (1947) sec. 101.06 provides: "... Every employer and every owner
of a place of employment or a public building now or hereafter constructed
shall so construct, repair, or maintain such place of employment or public
building.., as to render the same safe."
